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Abstract 
The historical significance of the tragedy on September 11 in 2001 may well be 
compared to the tragedy of June 28 in 1914 - the assassination in Sarajevo. Both 
tragedies closed two symbolic chapters of world history, i.e. that of the nineteenth 
century liberalism [1815-1914) and that of twentieth century nee-liberalism (1991- 
200 l). The view that September l l , 200 l opened a new chapter in global histo­
ry has found full confirmation in the poll of 275 opinion leaders conducted by the 
International Herald Tribune and the Pew Research Centre for People and Press. 
The phenomenon of global terrorism should be interpreted as a consequence of 
two failings in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first failing was the 
absence of a grand strategic vision for ordering the global stage after the 
col­lapse of the Soviet Empire. The second failing of the last decade of the 
twentieth century was the almost total disappearance of concern for the tragic 
plight of societies around the globe that led to polarization between rich and 
poor.
Keywords:Twenty-first century, globalization.
GLOBALISERING IN DIE EEN EN TWINTIGSTE EEU: OP SOEK NA 'N NUWE 
PARADIGMA 
Die historiese impak van die tragedie op 11 September 2001 kan vergelyk word 
met die tragedie op 28 Junie 1914 - die sluipmoord in Sarajevo. Beide tragedies 
sluit twee simboliese hoofstukke in die wereldgeskiedenis, naamlik die van die 
negentiende eeuse liberalisme (1815-1914) en die van die twintigste eeuse neo-lib­
eralisme (1991-2001). Die mening dot 11 September 2001 'n nuwe hoofstuk in die 
globale geskiedenis open, word ondersteun deur 'n meninsgopname onder 275 
invloedryke meningvormers deur die International Herald Tribune en die Pew­
navorsingsentrum. Die fenomeen van globale terrorisme kan ge"nterpreteer 
word as die gevolg van twee fatale flaters wat in die laaste dekade van die 
twintigste eeu gemaak is. Die eerste is die afwesigheid van 'n oorhoofse 
strategiese visie ten opsigte van die ordening van die globale verhoog no die 
ineenstorting van die Sowjetryk. Die tweede is die byna algehele afwesigheid 
van empatie oor die tragiese toestand van talle gemeenskappe regoor die 
wereld wat aanleiding gegee het tot 'n polarisasie tussen arm en ryk lande. 
Sleutelwoorde: 21ste eeu, globalisasie.
This is an extended version of a paper delivered by Professor Antoni Kuklinski, a Polish 
town and regional planner. in Warszawa, Zoliborz, January 7, 2002. Published in Polish 
in Polska w Europie, 2001:4(38), Worszawa. 
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Introduction 
0 nly by helping the least fortunate [ ... J can the human family achieve 
the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. Democracy 
alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the Peoples of the world 
into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also 
against their ancient enemies - hunger, misery, and despair [ ... J. Our allies 
are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness" (Harry S Truman as 
quoted in the Rand Corporation Calendar 2002). 
Over the last decades of the twentieth century, what may be called 'the clas­
sical paradigm of globalization' emerged'. The impression made in those 
years was that the classical paradigm would continue to be relevant to the 
vision of the world set to take shape in the twenty-first century. The tragedy of 
September 11, 2001, however, has disrupted this evolutionary scheme of 
thinking. Indeed, to a large extent the classical paradigm of the twentieth 
century has lost its force as a concept explaining and organizing the 
processes of globalization in the twentieth century. Today we must embark 
upon a quest for a new paradigm. This paper accepts the basic definition of 
a paradigm as "a set of questions addressed to the objective reality and a 
set of answers formulated in response to those questions" (Table 1). 








- = The boundory be1ween the old ond new paradigm 
A paradigm, which supports our inclination to provide old answers to old 
questions must be rejected - or at least deeply transformed. We have 
to look for a new paradigm; one that demands new answers to old 
questions and new answers to new questions. 
Compare Bunz H & A Kuklinski (eds). 2001. Globalization. Experiences and prospects. Warsaw: Friednch 
bert Stiftung. 
Globclizatian. International Social Science Journal. UNESCO June 1999: 160. Pans. 
Poverty. International Social Science Journal. June 1996: 144, op cit. 
Governance. International Social Science Journal. Morch 1999: 155, op elf. 
Deacon B. 2000. Globolization ond sociol policy. UNRISD, Occasional paper 2000:5. Geneva. 
Weisbrot M. 2001. How the IMF messed up Argentina. International Herald Tribune. December 26•. 
Saikal A. 2001. Afghanistan will want American commitment this time. International Herald Tribune. 
December 28•. 
Pentilla R. 2001. The concert is back and It seems to be working. International Herald Tribune, December 
28". 
Kapuscinski R. 2001. lnnego swiata nie bedzie. Rzeczpospo/ita - plus - minus. December 29"-30·. 
Rifkin J. Giabalny fajrant. 2001. Gazeta \,1/yt)orcza. December 29·-301". 
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Within just such an intellectual framework, the present discussion paper 
pursues the following thematic sequence: 
I. The tragedy of September 11, 2001 as a new chapter in global
history
II. The underlying causes of the tragedy
Ill. The classical paradigm of globalization developed in the last
decades of the twentieth century
IV. The trajectories leading to a new paradigm
V Pax Triadica, Pax Americana, Pax Dei.
I. The tragedy of September 11, 2001 as a new chapter in global
history
In its historical significance the tragedy of September 11'" 2001 may well 
be compared with the tragedy of June 2 8, 19 14 - the assassination in 
Sarajevo'. Both tragedies closed two symbolic chapters of world history, i.e. 
that of nineteenth century liberalism (1815-1914) and that of twentieth century 
neo-liberalism (1 9 91-2001 ). The view that September 11, 2001 has opened 
a new chapter in global history has found full confirmation in the poll of 275 
opinion leaders conducted by the International Herald Tribune3 and the Pew 
Research Centre for the People and Press. Those opinion leaders from 24 
countries answered inter alia the following question: "Has the terrorist 
attack in the United States and the subsequent war opened up a new 
chapter in world history, or do you think this will not turn out to be such a 
significant event?" A quantitative characteristic of the answers is present­
ed in Table 2.
The structure of the answers presented in Table 2 points to two conclusions: 
1) The preponderance of the view - 'new chapter'
2) The global uniformization of the expressed opinions.
The International Herald Tribune indirectly suggests that the opinions of 
the 275 personalities are relevant and representative'. We do, however, 
have to maintain a necessary dose of skepticism: 
1) The group of 275 personalities is very narrow, and limits the cog­
nitive value of the poll - even if the poll had been designed and
implemented in accord with state-of-the-art techniques in public
opinion polling
2 Compare: Davies N. 1998. Europa - rozprawa historyka z historia. Znok. Krok6w. 
3 How the world sees the US ond September 11• 1ntemational Herald Tribune. December 20" 2001. 
, International Herald Tribune. op cff. 
95 
Acta Structilia 2002:9(2) 
Table 2: The answers on the question regarding a new chapter in history 
Mega-regions 










New chapter in 
78% 79% 76% 73% 90% 69% 90% 80% 
world history 
Not such a 
20 18 22 20 10 29 10 17 
significant event 
Don1 know/ 
2 3 2 7 0 2 0 3 
Refused to onswer 
Source: International Herald Tribune. op cit 
2) The global uniformization of answers indicates that the 275 per­
sonalities belong to the global elite, which ipso facto is more like­
ly to reflect 'global' opinions than are societies representing the
particular mega-regions at large.
These sceptical remarks are not aimed at questioning the general con­
clusion that the tragedy of September 11 '" has opened a new chapter 
in global history. For it remains a compelling hypothesis, the merits of 
which will be verified in upcoming inquires, studies and discussions -
and the unfolding of events. 
II. The underlying causes of the tragedy
We must dig down to the underlying causes of the tragedy. Interpretations, 
which grasp merely the surface of the problem and only the final links in 
the casual chain of events, lead to mistaken and dangerous conclu­
sions from the point of view of the future of the twenty-first century. The 
phenomenon of global terrorism should be interpreted as a conse­
quence of two failings of the last decade of the twentieth century. The 
first failing was the absence of a grand strategic vision of ordering the 
global stage following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The victorious 
liberal-democratic coalition invested inordinate hope in, and even dei­
fied market processes that were expected to spontaneously create a 
'brave new world'. 
Market processes are excellent instruments of the present's 'automatic' 
regulation of the development of the global economy. And yet market 
forces are not able to engender the break-through innovations required 
to change the structure and modus operandi of economies, society 
and the state. This is the domain of visionary strategic political decisions. 
An excellent example in this field was the opportunity to design and 
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implement a 'Marshall Plan II', which in a strategic way would have 
changed the qualitative development of the post-communist world. 
Guided processes of transformation would have created much better 
results than those to be observed in the spontaneous anarchy of the 
real events shaping the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe5 • 
Of course, the concept of a Marshall Plan is only one example of a 
grand vision which could have been designed and implemented in the 
last decade of the twentieth century and have led to a new organiza­
tion of the world. 
In this vein it is worthwhile to review the charming and illuminating intel­
lectual joke of The Economist" published in the New Year Issue of 1993 
as a sui generis science fiction under the title: "Looking back from 2992 
- World History, Chapter l 3 - The disastrous 21 '' Century." Let me present
three passages from that essay':
This was an opportunily of a magnitude the world had rarely seen before. 
As Chapter l 2 explained, the three-sided War of Ideas that had occupied 
most of the 20'" century ended in a sweeping victory for the once appar­
ently doomed forces of liberalism. The defeat of racial totalitarianism in 
1945 having been followed by the defeat of communist totalitarianism in 
1989-91, the victorious pluralists seemed to have the future at their feet. The 
failure of clear thinking applied to all three members of the victorious coali­
tion - the United States, the European Communily and Japan. They could, 
if they wished, have brought a share of liberty and prosperily too much of 
the rest of the world by the end of the 21 '' century. They did wish it. But they 
failed to see that to succeed they had to remain a partnership. Instead, 
each of the three almost at once started to assert itself against others. 
Looking back from 2992 one can see why the democracies missed the 
great opportunily they were given in the 1990s. The fact that they had had 
to spend the 20'h century fighting their two-front War of Ideas, against com­
munism and fascism, was itself a sign that a cycle of history was approach­
ing its end. The democracies needed to re-examine the ideas that had 
created this cycle: but they left the re-examination too late. 
The lost opportunity of the l 990s is the first underlying cause of the 
tragedy of September 11 . The great strategic mistakes in the history of 
mankind are bearing tragic fruits. Is this truth comprehensible to George 
W Bush, who de facto is a magnificent nineteenth century President of 
the United States of America? However, is nineteenth century thinking 
suitable for decision-making in the twenty-first century? I hope that this 
Kuklinski A. 1995. The growth of knowledge ond the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In: Kuklinski A (ed). Baltic Europe in the perspective of global change. Warsaw: Euroreg 
The Economist. December 26" 1992 to January 8" 1993. 
The Economist, op cit, pp l 7 -l 9. 
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strong value judgment is simply wrong. Nonetheless, we should find 
strong arguments for the rejection of this value judgment. 
The second failing of the last decade of the twentieth century was the 
almost total disappearance of concern over the tragic plight of soci­
eties all around the globe, coupled with a frequent conscious and 
unapologetic ignoring of mechanisms that have led to a polarization 
between rich and poor unprecedented in history. In the global ocean 
of social Darwinism, social sensitivity has almost vanished. The Triad was 
grosso modo interested only in the issues of the wealthy North. The 
tragedy of illness and misery in the South has vanished from global 
awareness. The transfer of assistance from the rich countries to the poor 
countries in the nineties declined to the lowest level in the second half 
of the twentieth century. The growth of global terrorism cannot be 
explained without the role of misery, something, which creates the cli­
mate for terrorist activities'. This is the second underlying reason of the 
tragedy of September l l . 
In addressing the underlying causes of the tragedy, in no way do I mean 
to justify the heinous acts of the monsters that committed the crimes of 
September 11. Nor by any means do I seek to call into question the right 
of the antiterrorist coalition to employ full-scale military power in the 
battle against global terrorism. On the contrary: my point is that this is 
not the only method of liquidating the causes of the tragedy. Without 
addressing underlying causes as well, the enormous problems of the 
twenty-first century cannot be resolved. 
Ill. The classical paradigm of globalization developed in the last 
decades of the twentieth century 
We need to analyse three foundations of this paradigm. As the first foun­
dation we recognize the astounding technological progress and espe­
cially the breakthroughs in the field of information and telecommunica­
tion technologies [ICTJ. The matter of the technologies of the twentieth 
and twenty-first century is comprehensively analysed in a multitude of 
magnificent studies and publications developed within the framework 
of the theoretical and pragmatic infrastructure created by the OECD9• 
In this context the following observation of R Miller, W Michalski and B 
Stevens 10 is pertinent: 
a Cl: Kristof ND. 2001. To put terror out of business give Afghans a living. International Herold Tribune, 
December 15"-16". 
9 OECD. Technology and economy key relationships. Paris. 1992. 
10 Miller R et alia. 1998. The promises and perils of 21' century technology. An overview of the issues in 
OECD - 21' century technologies - promises and perils of a dynamic future. Par�. 
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If the risk can be managed, it is plausible that over the next twenty-five 
years a panoply of technological advances will vastly improve human wel­
fare as well as help set the world's development on a sustainable course. 
However, as history demonstrates, the availability of a particular scientific 
discovery or innovative technology is no assurance that its potential will be 
extended into useful applications, nor that it will diffuse widely or to those 
who might use it most productively. Reaping the rewards and reducing the 
dangers generated by technological advances depend on a complex 
interaction with underlying economic, social and political conditions. 
Realizing the fruits of socio-technical dynamism demands careful consid­
eration of two dimensions: first how various socio-economic environments 
lead to differences in the pace and direction of technological innovation 
and diffusion; and second, what the implications are of the uses and 
spread of new technologies for the economy and society. 
Reading the grosso modo optimistic content incorporated into the 
OECD publications, we should also remember the critical observations 
of R. Golar", who attempts to argue that in the second half of the twen­
tieth century we had a deficit of breakthrough innovations. 
The second foundation of the classical paradigm is the huge growth of 
the scale and importance of the world of finances,.which, following the 
processes of deregulation and liberalization, transformed into the most 
important domain of the global economy. In the last decade of the 
twentieth century the world of finance transformed into a phenomenon 
of huge scale having almost total autonomy in relation to the world of 
tangible objects. An observation made by K Valaskakis12 should be quot­
ed in this context: 
Whereas in the earlier part of the 20"' century, trade and empire were the 
drivers of globalization, in the last decade the· new drivers were technolo­
gy and capital flows. In this age of the internet, short-term foreign 
exchange flows amount to over 1 trillion US dollars on a daily basis as 
opposed to $4 trillion of trade flows on an annual basis. 
The champions of this phenomenon of 'dematerialization' will indicate 
that this is the triumph of the new world of finances over the old world of 
physical tangible objects. The critics however will respond by indicating 
that an ocean of speculative thinking and speculative modus operandi 
overwhelmed the world of finances. 
The third foundation of the classical paradigm is the market as the main 
manager of the global scene''. A sui generis deification of the market 
11 Golar R. 2001. Gospodarka oparta na wiedzy i innowacje przetomowe. In: Kuklinski A (ed). Gospodorka 
oparta no wiedzy (GOW). Warsaw: KBN. 
12 Valaskakis K. Globalization as a theatre. In: IS S J. op cit, p 154. 
13 Valaskakis K. op cit, p 158. 
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has emerged, one that deems the market to be the universal answer to 
all questions. The critic of this universal deification of the market may 
present two of many observations: 
l) The functional efficiency of the market is strongly differentiated
both in time and in space. The market functions well in a setting
characterized by sound institutional conditions" and especially
by an honest and efficient administration of law and justice
2) Like all creations of the human mind, market forces have to be
subordinated to supreme norms and values' 5• 
The three foundations of the classical paradigm - the world of technol­
ogy, the world of finances, and the world of the market - were in the 
past and will be in the future - very important factors in global devel­
opment and in the globalization of economies, society and gover­
nance. But these three forces cannot be transformed into a Pantheon 
of three Deities - withdrawn from the sphere of theoretical and prag­
matic critique. 
The transnational corporation'6 has been broadly recognized as the 
main vehicle and hero of globalization and the most efficient form of 
" Porwit K. Globalization context ond challenges for the possible future. Evolution of a socio-economic 
order in Poland. In: H Bunz & A Kuklinski (eds). Globalization, op cit. 
15 Pfaff l<!N. 1998. 'NtKrt happens, when market forces get out of control. International Herald Tribune, July 14". 
16 Compare: Barnet RJ & J Cavanagh. 1994. Global dreams - imperial corporations and the New World 
order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
ZO!ska A, & Ku Globalizacji. 1998. Przemiany w korparacjach transnaradowych i gospodarce swia­
towej. Warsaw: PWN. 
Compare also the great laudatio of multinational corporations by Gore! M & JP Lehman. 2002. The 
21• century needs corporate driven globalization. lHT, January 4°. Three quotations from this article: 
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The impact of corporate-driven globalization is, on balance, highly positive on the wel­
tare and development of the countries concerned. Generally - of course there are 
exceptions, as always - the standards maintained by multinational corporations in labor 
conditions, environment. stakeholder relationships and social contributions are signifi­
cantly higher than those of local firms. This is not to suggest that multinational corporate 
leaders are superior moral beings. Simply, these matters are dictated by good business 
strategy and the logic of contemporary capitalism. 
Corporate-driven market globalization generates entrepreneurship, competition and 
both job and wealth creation. The allegation that it promotes oligopoly is nonsense. 
Twenty years ago, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development. there 
were about 6 OOO multinational corporations. Today there are more than 60 OOO - of 
which 10 OOO come from the developing world. 
With the debris of Seattle behind us, and in the hope that Doha will provide firmer foun­
dations for erecting a solid economic edifice for the 21" century, let us make up for lost 
time, get this century right and in 2002 look to the future with confidence that capitalist 
corporate-driven market globalization has a fantastic, unprecedented potential for 
human well-being. On these foundations, let us build a better world - and resist all efforts, 
no matter how well intentioned, to plunge it back into the misery that plagued a good 
deal of the 20• century. 
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governance. This model of governance is very often an inspiration in 
the processes of reform and transformation designed and implement­
ed in international organizations, the institutions of government and self­
government on global, continental, national, regional and local scales. 
The classical paradigm of globalization is the focus of a multitude of 
studies and publications demonstrating a very high theoretical and 
methodological level and sponsored by numerous academic institu­
tions and international organizations. There is no doubt, however, that 
the OECD"- a unique scientific and political institution steadily integrat­
ing innovative currents of theoretical and pragmatic thinking - is the 
most important institution in the realm of creating the doctrine of glob­
alization. 
IV. The trajectories leading to a new paradigm
In the transformation of the old paradigm and the creation of the new 
paradigm - four trajectories may be envisaged. The first trajectory is the 
humanization of technology in the spirit of the last UNDP Report18 • 
'Making Technology Work for Human Development'. Let us quote six theses 
from the Report: 
l) The technology divide does not have to follow the income divide.
Throughout history. technology has been a powerful tool for human
development and property reduction. The market is a powerful engine
of technological progress
2) The market is a powerful engine of technological progress - but it is not
powerful enough to create and diffuse the technologies needed to
eradicate poverty
3) Developing countries may gain especially high rewards from new
technologies, but they also face especially severe challenges in 
managing the risks
4) The technology revolution and globalization are creating a network age
and that is changing how technology is created and diffused
5) Even in the network age, domestic policy still matters. All countries,
even the poorest, need to implement policies that encourage
innovation, access and the development of advanced skills
6) National policies will not be sufficient to compensate for global market
failures. New international initiatives and the fair use of global rules. are
needed to channel new technologies towards the most urgent needs
of the world's poor people.
" Woroniecki J. 2000. OECD on the threshold of the XXI century. Its glorious past on going reforms 
and prospects. In: Kuklinski A & W Orlowski (eds). The knowledge based economy. The global 
chaffenges of the XXI Century. Warsaw. 
1s UNDP, Human Development Report 2001. Making new technologies work for human development. New 
York. 
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These six theses indicate that the UNDP is trying to use the language of 
the world's poor. Therefore, we should not read only the publications of 
the OECD, which, after all, represent the point of view of the rich, who, 
following the gospel Saint Matthew, are most successful_ in multiplying 
talents. The second trajectory is the implementation of the proposal of 
L. Emmerij'9 concerning a global social contract, something that will kin­
dle the hope of the poorest 20% of the global population. Let us quote
the original formulation of L Emmerij:
What is most urgently needed is a global social contract with special 
emphasis on meeting the basic needs of the world population, including 
the poorest 20%. Probably the most important challenge in the negotia­
tions for such a Contract is how to insert free and rapidly expending glob­
al capitalism into a socially, environmentally and politically accountable 
system to benefit all citizens of the world. The inevitable second challenge 
then becomes how new socioeconomic and political spaces can be 
organized at the regional and world levels within which nation-states would 
lose a degree of sovereignty in exchange for new forms of free and par­
ticipatory democratic institutions. 
Just as it was being recognized during the first half of the 20'" century in the 
industrial countries that national poverty could be tackled, so it is impera­
tive that during the first half of the 21 s, century it is recognized that relieving 
the populations of the world is not an unrealistic target. 
A Found [Foundation (Editor)] must be set up (which may well precede the 
conclusion of the Global Social Contract) in order to start implementing the 
idea of a more equitable distribution of global wealth. Global enterprises -
the creators of global wealth - must take a contribution to this Found. 
The global social contract is a great challenge for the twenty-first cen­
tury. The. inspiring paper of L Emmerij is to a certain extent a follow up of 
two earlier publications20 related to the activity of that author. The third 
trajectory leading to a new paradigm is the rehabilitation of the idea of 
the nation-state on both the scale of individual countries and the globe. 
The tragedy of September 11 '" should create an impulse to look anew 
upon the fate of the nation-state in the new conditions of the twenty-first 
century. There is no doubt that certain important functions of the nation­
state cannot be transferred to any other institution. In this context we 
find new power in the arguments of the volume "States against mar­
kets"", inspired by the theoretical and methodological concept of the 
French Regulation School. The fourth trajectory is the development of a 
19 Emmerij L Major development challenges - globally and regionally In: Bunz H & A Kuklinski (eds). 
Globalization. Experiences and prospects. op cit. 
20 Vide: Emmerij L (ed). 1997. Economic and social development into the XXI Century. Inter American 
Development Bank, Washington DC 
21 Boyer R & D Dracke. 1996. States against markets - the limits of globalization. London: Routledge. 
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new concept of 'global governance'. This concept cannot be reduced 
only to the .war against global terrorism. 'Global governance' must be 
seen as an instrument in the construction of a better and more egali­
tarian global reality. 
These four trajectories, to my mind, hold forth an opening of the way for 
a reconstruction of the old paradigm and the construction of a new 
paradigm. We need a new hierarchy of fundamental values creating a 
moral and political climate for the construction of the new paradigm. 
The new paradigm will also provide new answers to the new questions of 
globalization and the privatization of terrorism. 
V. Pax Triadica, Pax Americana, Pax Dei
The new paradigm can emerge only in the context of a new v1s1on of 
the global future. In the last quarter of the twentieth century this vision 
was expressed in the concept of Pax Triadica". The triadic pattern of 
cooperation and competition - the USA, European Union, and Japan -
seemed at that time to form the main axis of the organization of the 
global reality". The tragedy of September 11 th generated the hope that 
Pax Triadica will be replaced by a more general solution. Contrary to 
these expectations, the lost months have accelerated the growth of uni­
lateral American diplomacy, which per pacta and facto concludentia 
is implementing the idea of Pax Americana". 
22 The Lisbon Group. 1995. The limits of competition. MIT. The Group of Lisbon. The Gulbekian Foundation. 
" Caracostas P & M Muldur. 1997. Society - the endless frontier. A European vision of research and inno­
vation policies for the 21' century. European Commission, Bruksela. 
" Doalder IH & JM Lindsay. 2001. Unilateralism is alive and well in Washington. International Herald 
Tribune, December 21'. Compare also the following brilliant paper: Wade RH. 2002. America's empire 
rules an unbalanced world. IHT, January 4". The final part of this paper reads as follows: 
These power relations and exercises of statecraft are obscured in the current talk about glob­
alization. Far from being just a collapsing of distance and widening of opportunities for all, the 
increasing mobility of information, finance, goods and services frees the American govern­
ment of constraints while more tightly constraining everyonE; else. Globalization and the glob­
al supervisory organizations enable the United States to harness the rest of the world to its own 
rhythms and structure. 
Of course these arrangements do not produce terrorism in any direct way. But they are deeply 
implicated in the very slow economic growth in most of the developing world since 1980, and 
in the wide and widening world income inequality (The average purchasing power of the bot ­
tom lo percent of Americans is higher than that of two-thirds of the rest of the wand's population). 
Slow economic growth and vast income disparities, when seen as such, breed cohorts of part­
ly educated young people who grow up in anger and despair. Some try by legal or illegal 
means to migrate to the West; some join militant ethnic or religious movements directed at 
each other and their own rules. But now the idea has spread among a few vengeful funda­
mentalists that the United States should be attacked directly. 
The United States and its allies can stamp out specific groups by force and bribery. Bun in the 
longer run, the structural arrangements that replicate a grossly unequal world have to be 
redesigned, as we did at the Bretton Woods conference after World War II, so that markets work­
ing within the new framework produce more equitable results. Historians looking back a cen­
tury from now will say that the time to have begun was now. 
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In this context it is advisable to look once more at information published 
by IHT'5 and incorporated in Table 3 on the question: Do most people, 
many people, only some, or hardly any ordinary people think that US 
policies and actions in the world were a major cause of the attack? 
Table 3: The reaction of the respondents to the US policies and actions(%) 
People Total Western 
USA 
non-USA Europe 
Most people 0 26 9 
Many people 18 32 27 
Only some 48 29 37 
Hardly any 32 9 22 
Don't know/ 
2 4 5 
Refused to answer 


























The difference in relation to Table 2 is quite striking. Two observations are 
especially important: 
l) The megaregional differentiation in the structure of the answers
2) The contrast in the evaluation of US policies and actions as per
US versus non US (columns one and two in Table 3).
The promotion of the idea of Pax Americana in a global climate, 
where a vast section of non-US public opinion is indirectly saying to the 
US 'Medice cure te ipsum' may raise some very serious questions. 
Therefore, what our world's current and anticipated circumstances in 
the twenty-first century demand is neither Pax Triadica nor Pax 
Americana, but rather Pax Dei. Here I have in mind a new concept of 
Deus, one for both believers and atheists, of God as a synthesis of the 
ideas of goodness, love and truth. I think that the vision of Saint Francis 
of Assisi, so close to the heart of John Paul II, could be of supreme value 
in shaping the world of the twenty-first century. Let me quote in this con­
text the concluding sentences of an inspiring comment made by F 
Lewis26• "Andre Malraaux said that 'the 2P century will be spiritual or it 
2s IHT. December 20• 2001. op ctt. 
26 Compare: Lewis F. We need global ideas for the era ahead. International Herald Tribune. December 
21'2001. 
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won't be'. The world cannot run on power alone. Philosophers, scholars, 
leaders and all thoughtful people need to stop and consider now how 
to articulate some guiding ideas for this new age." 
In the discussions of the visions of globalization of the XXI century we 
face two dilemmas: primo - the Darwinian versus Franciscan visions: 
and secundo - the material versus spiritual visions. The rich imagination 
and the ability of visionary thinking is a conditio sine qua non in all activ­
ities leading to the development of a new paradigm of globalization. 
Conclusion 
The tragedy of September 11 'h should elicit our deep reflection into the 
causes and consequences of this turning point in global history". We 
should not let ourselves be fooled into believing that after a few months, 
the status quo ante will be re-established. The new visions for the twen­
ty-first century will emerge in a climate of deep uncertainty related to 
the global and individual future of humanity28 . This uncertainty should 
not lead to despair, but to a summoning of courage and the ability to 
think about the global future. 
This is the attitude and intention of this paper, one written in the hope 
that some of its ideas and suggestions will prove useful in the construc­
tion of a New Paradigm. I am aware that this paper contains many 
21 To ovoid the frop of simplistic egolttonsm in the evoluotion of the grond route of histoncol experiences 
pleose see, Landes D. 1998. The Weolth ond Poverty of Nations. Why some are so rich and same so 
poor_ London: Little Brown & Company. Landes asks: 
How big is the gap between rich and poor and what Is happening to it? Very roughly and 
briefly: the difference in income per head between the richest industrial nation, say 
Switzerland, and the poorest non-industrial country, Mozambique, is about 400 to l . Two 
hundred and fifty years ago, this gap between richest and poorest was perhaps 5 to l, 
and the difference between Europe and, say, east or South Asia (China or lndio) was 
oround l .5 or 2 to l. 
Is the gap still growing today? At the extremes, clearly yes. Some countries are not only 
not goining; they are growing poorer, relatively and sometimes absolutely. Others are 
barely holding their own. Others are catching up. Our tosk (the rich countries), in our own 
interest os well os theirs, is to help the poor become heolthier ond weolthier. If we do not, 
they will seek to take what they connot moke: ond if they connot earn by exporting 
commodities, they will export people. In short, wealth is an irresistible magnet; and pover­
ty is a potentiolly roging contaminant: it cannot be segregated, and our peoce and 
prosperity depend in the long run on the well-being of others. 
,a In this paper I have quoted several times the materials published in the International Herald Tribune. 
IHT is and will be in the future an especially inspiriting source of new materiols very useful in the con­
struction of the New Paradigm.Compare: 
l) Pfaff William. 2001. Don1 look for a New World Order after Afghan war. IHT, December 2200 -23°. 
2) Sampson Anthony. To defeat the terrorist, their grievances must be addressed. IHT, op cit. 
3) Rice Susan E. Africa is breeding future Bin Ladens. IHT. 
4) Levine RA, Economic puritanism is bad for Argentina, Too. lHT, December 31•, 2001, 
5) Krugman P, Argentina's crisis is a US failure. IHT, January � 2002 
6) Pfaff W. 2001 · 'MII the New Wood 0<der rest solely on Ame<ican might? IHT, December 29"-30" 2001. 
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empirical and methodological weaknesses'9, but to my mind they do 
not invalidate the main message of the paper. 
Comments on the discussion paper by Jan Woroniecki* 
First of all, the question arises as to whether we do we need a new par­
adigm to understand and, as far as feasible, to try to shape globalisa­
tion' as it unveils around us. To my mind, and apparently to Professor A 
Kukliriski's as well, the answer is an unequivocal yes. The reasons are 
numerous - and multi-faceted: both in terms of threats to humanity 
including the most recent international terrorism, and hopes, among 
them what is called (though prematurely) "the new economy"". The 
scope of change underway and its implications"', perhaps escapes our 
imagination and is extremely (or at least increasingly, despite IT) difficult 
to seize intellectually. Nevertheless, it is not just worth trying, but actually 
the effort to see the wood for the trees appears of tremendous impor­
tance as it (i e search for a new paradigm in the offing) may affect our 
prosperity, and perhaps even our survival. Otherwise, it would not be 
possible to undertake any global action to steer in, even slightly, the 
direction we are heading. With this in mind, I read the paper. 
Firstly, I tend to disagree that towards the end of the past century we 
had mastered the paradigm of globalisation; maybe it was about to 
emerge, but we were pretty far from taking full cognisance of it; espe-
29 In this paper, very often a critical judgment in relation of the USA was expressed. For an interesting lau­
datio of the American modus operandi. Please see: The patient accumulation of success - their mili­
tary achievement in Afganis!an should make Americans proud and the world optimistic. The Economist, 
December 2200 2001-January 4" 2002. 
Jan Woroniecki (PhD) is a professor at the Economic University of Warsaw, Poland. He is the Polish 
ambassador and a permanent representative at the OECD in Paris since 1997. Professor 
Woroniecki is also the Director of the Foreign Economic Policy Department and a senior advisor 
to the Polish Foreign Ministry. 
According to the OECD (countries and the Secretarial), tt constttutes the challenge confronting us, and 
our responsibiltty - shaping globalisation. Communique of the ministerial session of the OECD Council. 
Par�. OECD News Release, 27 June 2000. 
For its analysis, see: The new economy: Beyond the hype - final report on the OECD Growth Project. 
OECD study submitted to the ministerial session of the OECD Council. Paris, OECD, lo May 2001 and 
Woroniecki, Jan. New Economy: Illusion or reality? TIGER Working Poper Series No 5, Warsaw, Leon 
Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ), May 2001. 
The case against the global economy. And for a turn toward the local, ed. Jerry Mander & Edward 
Goldsmith. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1996 and Rifkin Jeremy. The end of work. The decline of 
the global labour force and the dawn of the post-market era. Wrocaw, Wyd. Dolnooelskie, 2001 
(Original version 1995). 
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cially in view of the fact (if we can use this term here) that the situation 
was still evolving in both economic and social aspects, perhaps less so 
in political ones, after the Cold War ended". I fully agree, however, that 
September 11, 2001 should be taken as a watershed for further deliber­
ations on globalisation XXI. Not because of the degree of shock (it was 
not the first massive terrorist attack, after all, though most dreadful and 
deadly - and spectacular) but as it demonstrated the fragility of our 
civilisation and reminded us of new (and old) divisions threatening our 
planet, including digital divisions, incidentally. But - foremost - are the 
social tensions both between the nations (countries) and within (includ­
ing the developed ones). 
The September 11, 2001 events and what they epitomise do open, regret­
tably, a new, sad chapter in global history. As a warning of the clash of 
civilisations, it is too early (as the media did) to speak of the clash in the 
present tense. It would be constructive (if that adjective is applicable at 
all within this topic) to treat the tragedy as a warning of yet another dan­
gerous division basically ignored after the energy crisis of the 70s - the 
North-South development and civilisational gap which by now has got 
even bigger, (and ODA - shrunk). Obviously, it would be wrong to give to 
the terrorist acts and Osama bin Loden, for that matter, such justifica­
tion. Neither himself, nor many his followers originate from poor and 
neglected families. And nothing justifies recourse to terror - neither polit­
ical nor economic (living standard) motives, and the terror never helps 
to achieve any (professed sincerely or not) goals in those domains. Still, 
rising extremism, religious or otherwise, often testifies to the inherent 
problems within the society - or the notion. The poll to which Professor 
Kuklinski refers may reflect a certain overreaction; still, it calls for careful 
scrutiny. 
The link between global terrorism and the absence of a great strategic 
vision after the end of the Cold War may be difficult to prove (apart from 
the assistance terrorists may hove received from in the course of the 
East-West, or US-USSR, rivalry), but the (first) weakness in the form of the 
absence of such a vision, and action that would derive therefrom, is 
unquestionable. For instance, all calls for a Marshall Plan-bis to assist 
countries in transition and/or developing countries out of the economies 
on armaments fell on deaf ears, even though such assistance, wisely 
managed, would generate markets for developed countries' exports 
and DFI, and enhance stability. Unfortunately, even limited schemes 
promoted by Austria to launch such a pion only for the sake of environ-
I wonder why we don't speak of it as World War Ill; it divided the globe into two hostile camps and ended 
by a clear victory for the US-led 'coalition' and loss of the now defunct USSR forceful 'coalition' 
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mental protection in Central and Eastern Europe were never approved. 
And - as Professor Kuklinski rightly notes - the invisible hand of the mar­
ket is incapable of bringing about any visionary strategic political deci­
sions. The mighty politicians proved no better; perhaps to confirm the 
worrisome 'public choice' theory which, distrusts politicians' officially 
declared motivations to act in favour of society (state) and maintains 
that they in fact care only for their own interests and ambitions. Surely, 
this was a lost opportunity of the two last decades of the XX century. Are 
present politicians any better, and more socially sensible, in particular 
the social democrats prevailing in Europe? At least they have been 
confronted with the new threat and are beginning to realise that winning 
the war (World War IV?) against international (and nationally supported -
or even generated, as the case may well be) terrorism is not only a 
long-term endeavour, but also quite hopeless if the underlying reasons, 
and roots of the evil, are not eliminated or markedly alleviated (in this 
way, the tragedy may contain a blessing - if the message is grasped). 
It must also be realised that the current technological revolution (like all 
previous ones) carries the risk of deepening inequalities and generating 
losers. There is perhaps one difference exacerbating the danger: owing 
to ICT, people are much more aware of inequalities and are much bet­
ter equipped to compare their fate with that of others'. Thus the second 
weakness to which Professor Kuklinski alludes represents under globali­
sation an even bigger threat - if not remedied. Misery may not be a 
direct cause of terrorismv, but it certainly creates the climate, and helps 
terrorists to find and indoctrinate their allies. 
What Professor Kuklinski calls a "classical paradigm" of globalisation, is a 
set of three key foundations, or constituent parts, of the global econo­
my and society which were formed (or crystallised) in the last decades 
of the XX century: ICT and sprouts of the new economy which go far 
beyond technological achievements in computerisation and commu­
nications, global finance and the role of (the deified) market (perhaps 
more in services and investment than in 'conventional' merchandise). All 
this is closely interrelated (with mutual reinforcement) with liberalisation 
and deregulation policies (advertised inter alia by OECD). Of course, all 
three foundations will continue to be with us well into the XXI century, if 
not a millennium. It seems though that our existence based on three 
foundations only may well prove to be shaky. A social equity, or solidar­
ity, and an ethical foundation is missing. Economic, financial and tech­
nological factors do not suffice, and development (sensu largo) without 
'human face' may simply break down. This is why - most importantly -
there is a need to search for a new paradigm and trajectories leading 
Terrorism is not the only scourge. The Economist. 5 December 2001, p l 0. 
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in this direction - as Professor Kuklinski puts it. 
The technological revolution and globalisation (assisted by liberalisation) 
are indeed creating a network age, network society and network 
economyv1. The point is to be wired, included - as distinct from the 
adverse phenomenon of exclusion even in rich societies. Professor 
Kuklinski defines the first trajectory as the humanisation of technology, 
which is - after all - just a tool to be used in any imaginable manner, 
human or even inhuman (the Internet by terrorists!). Technological poli­
cy therefore matters, and - as UNDP submits - not only on a national 
scale but also within the international dialogue expected to bring glob­
al rules to diffuse technologies to those who cannot afford them and 
get new international initiatives going, supposedly, in the same direc­
tion. An example of such an initiative is arguable: a Global Social 
Contract (and Fund) based on redistribution of wealth, financed by 
TNCs (does that mean that governments and state budgets may feel 
relieved?), a bit similar to the Global Compact of Kofi Annan, to fight 
poverty, may actually petrify it, unless it is used to give the poor a fish­
ing rod rather than a rotten fish. While a global social contract (as the 
second trajectory) would be welcome, it is a very difficult task to nego­
tiate who sits at the negotiating table. An attempt with NIEOv,, may have 
taught a lesson regarding such over-ambitious initiatives. The third tra­
jectory, which is a rejuvenation of the nation-state's role and responsi­
bility (made easier after the eruption of patriotism after the terrorist 
attack against the US) boils down, it seems, to the role of governments 
domestically and internationally (globally), especially as regulators of 
markets. This leads Professor Kuklinski to the crucial fourth trajectory, 
which is in fact intertwined with all previous ones, of global, i.e. chiefly 
intergovernmental, governance. Along these paths a new paradigm is 
to be sought - to provide new and up-to-date answers to the new (and 
old) questions uppermost in our minds. One can argue that setting such 
trajectories (as boundaries between them are blurred) calls for some 
refining; still, essential elements of the paradigm are there (without the 
geopolitical, now of lesser importance as the bipolar world is no more 
with us). 
As to the overall (philosophical) vision of the future, or the "central 
organising idea", Pax Del is advocated by Professor Kuklinski to replace 
Pax Americana (contested by many) or Pax Triad/ea (which does not 
function well, either). Pax Del is understood to be a sort of global moral­
ity, a set of common values uniting humanity: "God for the Believers and 
v1 Castells Manuel. 2001. The rise of a network society. Oxford/Malden: MT, Blackwell Publishers. 
" New International Economic Order, launched unsuccessfully in the UNGA in 197 3-7 4 under the shock 
generated by the oil crisis. 
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Atheists", as he put it; one based on Franciscan and spiritual premises 
rather than on Darwinian and materialist ones. A longing for such a spir­
itual order is understandable, not only because - and after - the events 
of September 11, 2001. Indeed the pace of technological change 
breeds uncertainty, not only prosperity (and not to all). It is easier to lose 
than to catch up, let alone to win in a highly competitive world. How to 
achieve such Pax Dei though, and to whom to entrust the task? And who 
will dare to indicate those trusted ones? 
Professor Kuklinski's conclusion that the time has come (or is overdue) to 
think about the global (our) future is beyond discussion. The construction 
(or reading from events, with the subsequent correction) of a new par­
adigm of irresistible globalisation'm is more than timely. This message of 
the paper deserves to be considered soon. 
Annex 
One can often observe a tendency to demonise globalisation, to 
ascribe to it almost the features of a living thing, sometimes malicious 
and acting not necessarily with the best intent. Contemporary globali­
sation brought about to a large extent by ICT and opportunities creat­
ed by the Internet is not a doctrine, or a blueprint, or yet a devil's idee
fixe invented by someone and then enforced; rather, it is a conglomer­
ate of phenomena underway in the global village we are in. Its scope 
goes much beyond economic matters (like the activity of TNCs, nota
bene older than globalisation); it covers lifestyles and consumption pat­
terns ('McDonaldisation'); and it carries both threats and promise. It 
makes no sense whatsoever to fight it or deliberate whether we should 
allow globalisation to take place (or continue) or eliminate it (block): it 
enjoys a sort of independent existence, neither good nor evil by defini­
tion. That does not mean that only a determinist stance is possible, that 
nothing can be done about it. Efforts may and should be undertaken to 
try to shape (or correct) its mechanisms - and 'face'. The point is, who, 
by virtue of whose mandate, and on what means, to do it? In other 
words exercising a global interventionism, as necessary as it is. With 
governments and their organisations (IGOs'' like the UN system, OECD, 
"" See enclosed comment on globalisation made at the seminar (Warsaw. 22 November. 200 l ) devot­
ed to the promotion of the book sponsored by F Stiftung Foundation: Globalisation. Experiences and 
prospects. Bunz H (ed) & A Kuklinski. Warsaw. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2001. The book contains my arti­
cle entitled: The visions of globalisation (comparison of neo-liberal versus social democratic policy 
frameworks). Statement at the F Ebert Stiftung seminar on Globalisation: Experiences and Prospects. 
Warsaw. 22 November 2001. 
Inter-Governmental Organisations. 
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EU). It is not easy to reach a consensus, especially regarding far-reach­
ing initiatives, not to mention resources, influential NGOs, TNCs, or some 
sort of a governmental-NGO mix. Nevertheless, it appears urgent to 
strive to reduce· negative phenomena which were not born of globali­
sation but which are accompanying it and may be intensified (i.e. 
inequalities). I have in mind some sort of curbing or 'civilising', not glob­
alisation as such, but precisely those adverse phenomena, which give 
rise to complaints (and vivid protests) that globalisation harms people. 
There is clearly a high demand for such a regulatory function (or glob­
al governance), especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, and earlier protests starting from those against MAI' negotiated in 
OECD and Seattle, provided it is not going to be another NIEO" or a 
somewhat utopian Global Social Contract (between whom?). Apart 
from such a function an inter-cultural dialogue needs to be initiated, 
leading to enhancing tolerance through understanding, and ensuring 
(defence of) cultural diversity. If we are to avoid self-destruction, we 
should move in this direction. 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (after the protests the effort was abandoned by OECD although 
the text was almost ready ond agreed). 
New International Economic Order launched in the UNGA in mid-70s and approved in the atmosphere 
of energy crisis - to oppeose the Group 77 (developing countries). Its provisions were never imple­
mented. 
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